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Abstract: At the heart of Kant’s legal-political philosophy lies a liberal, republican ideal of justice understood in 
terms of private independence (non-domination) and subjection to public laws securing freedom for all citizens as 
equals. Given this basic commitment of Kant’s, it is puzzling to many that he does not consider democracy a minimal 
condition on a legitimate state. In addition, many find Kant ideas of reform or improvement of the historical states 
we have inherited vague and confusing. The aim of this paper is to untangle both puzzles by exploring Kant’s idea 
of self-governance. I argue that Kant’s idea of self-governance gives us a very good starting point for thinking about 
how to leave room for a variety of political systems—different ideals—that have grown out of and responding to 
different contingent historical and cultural circumstances. It also helps us identify those areas where we want to take 
extra care to build in safeguards to secure stability and to take sufficiently seriously humankind’s truly nasty sides.
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Auto-governo e reforma no republicanismo liberal de Kant – teoria ideal e não-ideal na  
Doutrina do Direito
Resumo: No coração da filosofia politico-jurídico de Kant repousa um ideal de justiça liberal, republicano, compreendido 
em termos de independência privada (não-dominação) e submissão a leis públicas que garantem a liberdade de 
todos os cidadãos como iguais. Dado esse compromisso básico de Kant, é algo que chama a atenção de muitos 
o fato dele não considerar a democracia como uma condição mínima de um estado legítimo. Além disso, muitos 
consideram que as ideias de Kant sobre reforma e melhoria do estado histórico que herdamos são ideias vagas e 
confusas. Argumento que a ideia de Kant de autogoverno nos fornece um ótimo ponto de partida para pensarmos o 
modo de como deixar espaço para uma variedade de sistemas políticos – diferentes ideais – que surgem e respondem 
a diferentes contextos históricos e circunstâncias culturais. Ela também nos ajuda a identificar aquelas áreas a que 
queremos dedicar um maior esforço no sentido de construir garantias de modo a assegurar estabilidade e nos ajuda, 
também, a levar a sério aquelas dimensões humanas verdadeiramente nefastas.
Palavras-chave: autogoverno; republicanismo; ideal; história.
1. INTRODUCTION1
At the heart of Kant’s legal-political philosophy lies a liberal, republican idea of justice understood in 
terms of private independence (non-domination) and instead subjection to public, universal laws securing 
freedom for all as equals. In fact, our only innate, inalienable right is seen as our right to freedom—a right 
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Kant in his key work on justice, the Doctrine of Right, defines as a person’s right to “independence from 
being constrained by another’s choice… insofar as it [one’s exercise of freedom] can coexist with the 
freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law.” (MM 6: 237, cf. 317)2 Time and time again, 
and throughout this work, Kant emphasizes that freedom is “the principle and indeed the condition for 
any exercise of coercion” (MM 6: 340)—making rightful coercion the “hindering of a hindrance to freedom 
in accordance with a universal law” (MM 6: 231) and the just state one in which “law itself rules and 
depends on no particular person.” (MM 6: 340, cf. 316) Despite agreement among scholars that any 
plausible interpretation of Kant’s theory of justice has to view these ideas as central to it, much interpretive 
disagreement persists with regard to what kind of theory of justice and rights we should attribute to him 
or the Kantian project. The suggestions span from rightwing libertarianism (BYRD; HRUSCHKA, 2012) 
to legal positivism3—with pretty much all the positions in between, including Rawlsian (GUYER, 2000) 
and need-based, welfarist (KAUFMAN, 1999; O’NEILL, 1996, 2000) liberalisms. In my view, Kant’s 
liberal republicanism is distinct from all of these other positions, though it incorporates important ideas 
typically advanced by them.4 Yet rather than engaging these, by now, more well trodden disagreements 
among prominent interpretations in much detail, this paper’s main aim is to attend to an issue that till date 
has received much less explicit discussion among Kant scholars, namely the issue of what conception of 
self-governance Kant defends.
My suggestion below is Kant’s idea of self-governance in the liberal republic can be specified by means 
of three complementary ideas: (i) The public authority as a tripartite, representative authority, whose 
reasoning can understood as legal-political reasoning within the parameters set by the citizens’ basic private 
and public rights and duties; (ii) free public debate (among all citizens as participants in public debates, 
including scholarly debates) within the parameters of free speech (including freedom of assembly and 
association and freedom of press); and, finally, (iii) reform of the public institutions over time so as to make 
it possible for any citizen (regardless of socio-economic starting point) to become an active member of the 
republic (active citizenship) and to work her or his way into any public position, including by ridding the 
offices of the public authority of appointments tracking inheritance and replacing them with merit-based 
evaluations. Exactly how particular societies go about realizing this idea of public representation and 
participation—which particular ideal they will be working out—will and should vary somewhat, depending 
on considerations of prudence and historical circumstances.
To address the topic of self-governance in Kant’s philosophy of right we must deal with several tricky 
interpretive and philosophical questions. More specifically, we need to address passages where Kant 
discusses issues such as the three possible forms of the state (autocracy, aristocracy, and democracy); 
the four different ways in which force, freedom, and law can be combined in the exercise of power in any 
particular state (anarchy, despotism, barbarism, and republic); the distinction between passive and active 
citizenship; the notion of citizens governing themselves through what Kant calls “public” and “private” 
reason; and, finally, the idea of imperfect, but minimally just states reforming themselves into well-functioning 
republics. Kant does give some suggestions as we set out to do this, but some of this work Kant explicitly 
and deliberately left behind for those coming after him. At the end of the “Preface” to the Doctrine of 
Right, Kant explains that he has
… worked less thoroughly over certain sections [dealing with public right] than might be expected in comparison 
with the earlier ones [dealing with private right], partly because it seems to me that they can be easily be inferred 
from the earlier ones and partly, too, because… [they] are currently subject to so much discussion, and still so 
important, that they can well justify postponing a decisive judgment for some time. (MM 6: 209)
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An idea informing this paper is that “some time” has passed now, and hence it is easier to make a few 
more suggestions regarding the structure of the public (legal-political) institutions comprising a just state 
than Kant himself did. The projects of trying to realize freedom-based legal-political institutional systems 
are not at as nascent a stage as they were at Kant’s time and with the help of Kant’s insights on the matter 
we can identify important elements of more successful, more recent developments in liberal, legal-political 
systems to help us clarify what it is that they and we, as citizens of such states, have been or are doing when 
things have gone well. Hence, my basic stance is that Kant gives us an extremely good starting point for 
thinking about our liberal legal-political structures, including how to improve or reform them in good 
ways. His approach also helps us identify where we want to leave quite a bit of space for variation between 
different systems due to their different particular histories and circumstances, and where we want to be 
particularly cautious and build extra safeguards in a prudential effort to take sufficiently seriously worries 
concerning stability as well as humankind’s truly nasty sides.
The paper is structured in the following way: Part One (“Kant’s Theory of Domestic Right – a Sketch”) starts 
by outlining the main strands of interpretation regarding core arguments of Kant’s concerning private and 
public right before briefly identifying what I take to be characteristic of the stronger readings. Then, in Part 
Two (“Self-Governance and Reform”) the focus is on the interpretive and philosophical issues concerning 
what Kant considers to be the first part of public right, namely the right of the state (public right) and the 
specific issues here that are important to clarify as we seek to understand Kant’s ideas of self-governance, 
including the very important role the ideas of public representation, free public discussion, and social 
mobility play in his vision of how states realize ideals of the idea of the “true” republic in our non-ideal 
world through institutional reform. I then proceed to defend Kant’s basic framework, arguing that part 
of its strength concerns the way in which the ideal (freedom based) principles set the framework within 
which the non-ideal (prudential and historically contingent or particular) considerations are given due 
consideration. This approach makes the idea of the just state imaginable as “stable for the right reasons,” to 
borrow Rawls’s useful term, and it makes it easier to identify and rectify possible mistakes made not only 
by Kant, but also by our current legal-political practices.
2. PART I: KANT’S THEORY OF DOMESTIC RIGHT – A SKETCH
Right, or justice, Kant suggests, concerns interaction in space and time. Before and unless there is 
interaction involving external (spatio-temporal) force—what Kant call’s external uses of freedom—there 
is at most only virtue. Only once we interact in ways that can directly affect (spatio-temporally interfere 
with) one another’s ability to set and pursue ends of our own does right as an issue arise. Those aspects 
of our actions, like their maxims and moral motivation that make actions virtuous—give them what 
Kant sometimes calls “moral worth” and involve exercises of “internal freedom”—are beyond the grasp of 
spatio-temporal means, or coercion. Indeed, anything that does not have spatio-temporal force, such as 
most uses of words, regardless of how mean, hurtful, or stupid they are, will not be criminalized in a just 
state. The absence of virtue cannot be criminalized because one cannot reach virtue (internal freedom) by 
the spatio-temporal means of the law (coercion, or external freedom) and because lacking virtue, as such, 
is not to wrong anyone else from the point of view of right (justice); to lack in virtue is not coercively to 
deprive others of their ability to act freely in the world.5 The only justifiable restrictions on interactions 
are those that can be imposed in the name of freedom, meaning that they are necessary to make reciprocal 
freedom under universal law possible for interacting persons.
doispontos:, Curitiba, São Carlos, volume 13, número 2, p. 39-70, outubro de 2016 
42
So which restrictions are justifiable from the point of view of right? Because we are embodied persons, 
Kant starts, from the external point of view of right, the relation between our bodies and our persons must 
be regarded as analytic in nature. From the point of view of space and time, that is, there is no discernible 
distinction between one’s body and one’s person, which is why, for example, unauthorized touching of 
another’s body is to commit battery. Hence, Kant concludes, since we have an innate right to freedom, we 
must also be seen as having an innate right to our own bodies (MM 6: 249).6 The next step is to explain 
how we can acquire rights with regard to things distinct from us, or separate from our bodies. Kant’s theory 
of private right is an account of this (of acquired, private right), namely of how we go about obtaining 
normative, enforceable claims to things distinct from us, such that no wrong is being done when these claims 
are enforced whereas wrong is being done when they are disrespected. Kant proposes that there are three 
kinds of objects with regard to which we make normative ownership claims on each other, namely things 
(“my” car), others’ services (you “owe” me five hours of work), and other persons (“my” child)—and this 
is why we have three categories of private right: private property right, contract right, and status right (right 
involving claims to other people, such as family right). According to Kant, in the state of nature (in a pre-state 
condition) our claims to these three kinds of things remain “provisional,” and only in a civil condition do 
they become “conclusive” rights. Conclusive rights are only possible through the establishment of a public 
authority—meaning an artificial legal-political authority that represents each and all of us (and yet no one 
in particular)—within the institutional parameters of which we interact as private persons.7
In addition to disagreements concerning how to understand each of the three principles of private right, 
there is much disagreement in the literature about Kant’s claim that in the state of nature individuals’ rights 
remain “provisional,” and some of these disagreements can be seen as separating the interpretations into 
the “libertarian,” “legal positivist,” “liberal republican” etc. traditions. This disagreement concerning the 
provisionality of private right in the state of nature includes a dispute regarding Kant’s answer to the question 
of why we need the state (the establishment of a public authority): is it merely for prudential reasons, for 
ideal reasons, or for some other reasons? In other words, what is it that the state (the public authority) can 
do that private individuals cannot do such that the state of nature is not, whereas civil society is a condition 
in which “conclusively” rightful relations are realizable; why, exactly, is right or justice unrealizable in the 
state of nature and realizable only within the public, legal-political institutional framework of civil society 
(the state)? What are, that is to say, (the nature of) the problems in the state of nature that the establishment 
of civil society is a solution to? The more careful interpretations here aim to tie their accounts of Kant’s 
idea of the state being necessary to conclude rights to Kant’s claims that although the state of nature does 
not need to be “a state of injustice… it would still be a state devoid of justice” (MM 6: 312) and that people 
who choose to stay in the state of nature and solve their disputes by feuding “do one another no wrong… 
but in general… do wrong in the highest degree by willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not 
rightful” (MM 6: 307).
On the prudential readings, the state is needed to safeguard us against our tendency to act in evil manners, 
or to deal with problems issuing from our “warped wood.”8 In contrast, on the ideal interpretations, the 
state does more than this: state is either seen as also solving certain ideal problems of assurance or as also 
solving such ideal problems of assurance in addition to solving certain ideal problems of indeterminacy 
regarding the general specification (positing) and particular specification (application) of the principles of 
private right.9 What is common on all the ideal readings is the idea that for Kant rightful force is impossible 
in the state of nature, including if we assume only virtuous intentions among the people finding themselves 
interacting in this condition. And without the possibility of rightful force, there is no justice since then 
there are no rightful, enforceable solutions even to reasonable disagreements that can occur among the 
interacting persons.
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Regardless of the various interpretations’ take on the question of why we need the state, the next issue they 
all must handle is what Kant envisions the state—the basic public legal-political authority or institutional 
framework—to look like. This is the topic of the second part of Kant’s account of domestic justice, which 
is his account of domestic public right (“The Right of a State”). And while his account of private right is 
limited to private persons’ claims on one another, the account of domestic public right concerns citizens’ 
claims on their public institutions. Kant starts his discussion of domestic public right by clarifying that the 
concept refers to “The sum of the laws which need to be promulgated generally in order to bring about a 
rightful condition.” (MM 6: 311) Shortly thereafter he continues by explaining that the moral idea of the 
public authority (the state)
consists of three persons…: the sovereign authority... in the person of the legislator; the executive authority in the 
person of the ruler (in conformity to law); and the judicial authority (to award to each what is his in accordance with the 
law) in the person of the judge… These are like the three propositions in a practical syllogism: the major premise, 
which contains the law of that will; the minor premise, which contains the command to behave in accordance 
with the law, that is the principle of subsumption under the law, and the conclusion, which contains the verdict 
(sentence), what is laid down as right in the case at hand. (MM 6: 313)
The idea of the public authority, in other words, is seen as divided into the three legal-political functions 
it has, namely the general specification (the sovereign, legislative authority), the particular specification or 
application (the judiciary authority), and the enforcement (the executive authority) of the law. In addition, 
since the general specification of the law has to occur prior to the specific specification, or application of 
this law to particular cases and the consequent enforcement of the verdict, the legislative function is the 
fundamental one and where the sovereign authority lies. Also, it is important to note that the public authority 
only acts through law, meaning that all exercises of public authority must be lawful. It is furthermore 
important for Kant that these three components can be thought of as “persons” in that they are inherently 
normative ideas enabled by our ability to be morally responsible for our actions and that these three 
persons can be seen as “distinct authorities… by which a state has its autonomy, that is, by which it forms 
and preserves itself in accordance with laws of freedom.” (MM 6: 318) That is to say, the three authorities 
must be legally (institutionally and functionally) distinguished from, yet seen as complementing each other 
in any minimally rightful state. Such a public tripartite legal-political authority is necessary for the citizens’ 
interactions to be subjected to (universal, public) law only and not to one another’s (private) choices, and 
so for the state to obtain its autonomy (be self-determining in accordance with law).10
Complementing this specification of the idea of the state, Kant also adds a clarification of the idea of the 
citizen. Because this is a complicated piece of text, let me quote Kant at length here:
The members of such a society who are united for giving law… are called citizens of a state… In terms of rights, 
the attributes of a citizen, inseparable from his essence (as a citizen), are: lawful freedom, the attribute of obeying 
no other law than that to which he has given his consent; civil equality, that of not recognizing among the people 
any superior with the moral capacity to bind him as a matter of right in a way that he could not in turn bind the 
other; and third, the attribute of civil independence, of owning his existence and preservation to his own rights and 
powers as a member of the commonwealth, not to the choice of another among the people… The only qualification 
for being a citizen is being fit to vote. But being fit to vote presupposes the independence of someone who, as 
one of the people, wants to be not just a part of the commonwealth but also a member of it, that is, a part of the 
commonwealth acting from his own choice in community with others. This quality of being independent, however, 
requires a distinction between active and passive citizens, though the concept of a passive citizen seems to contradict 
the concept of a citizen as such. The following examples can serve to remove this difficulty: an apprentice in the 
service of a merchant or artisan; a domestic servant (as distinguished for a civil servant); a minor… all women… 
All these people lack civil personality… This dependence [these people have] upon the will of others and this 
inequality is, however, in no way opposed their freedom and equality as human beings, who together make up a 
people; on the contrary, it is only in conformity with the conditions of freedom and equality that this people can 
become a state and enter into a civil constitution. But not all persons qualify with equal right to vote within this 
constitution, that is, to be citizens and not mere associates in the state. For from their being able to demand that 
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all others treat them in accordance with the laws of nature freedom and equality as passive parts of the state, it does 
not follow that they also have the right to manage the state itself as active members of it, the right to organize it or 
to cooperate for introducing certain laws. It follows only that, whatever sort of positive laws the citizens might 
vote for, these laws must still not be contrary to the natural laws of freedom and of the equality of everyone in the 
people corresponding to this freedom, namely that anyone can work [one’s]11 way up from this passive condition 
to an active one. (6: 314f)
The general idea of the citizen comprises, as we can see, the ideas of: a) lawful freedom, namely to be 
subject only to laws to which one has given one’s consent (through voting); b) civil equality, meaning to 
be treated by the laws of right as an equal subject with everyone else; and, finally, c) civil independence, 
that is, being able to secure one’s own existence and preservation merely by acting within the rights and 
powers everyone necessarily has as a member of the commonwealth, and hence, importantly, having this 
possibility not subjected to the choice of anyone else in the people.
Notice, first, that Kant here is quite careful to state that although freedom gives one a right to vote on the 
laws one is subjected to, one does not thereby have a right to decide (vote on) whether or not all citizens 
get rights or get sufficient legal protection to secure their basic existence and preservation. Moreover, the 
second condition, equality, secures each and all citizens the same basic (private and public) rights, whereas 
the third condition, independence, secures each and all citizens the right to legal protection of their basic 
rights, including legal access to basic means. What one obtains the right to vote on through one’s right to 
freedom is not, therefore, a right to vote to set aside the conditions of equality and independence—this 
no one can view themselves as authorized to do—but to vote on the specification of the laws by means 
of which one secures all citizens’ basic rights (taking part in the process of the specification or positing 
of private and public laws; exercising sovereign, legislative authority). Still, Kant emphasizes, one must 
allow for a distinction with regard to the first condition—freedom—since not everyone is able to vote as 
they lack the independence this requires. Of course, the obvious and non-controversial example here is 
children: children cannot as yet be morally responsible (lack the reasoning resources such independence 
requires), which is why they cannot be morally responsible for (vote on) the laws by means of which we 
enable rightful interactions between us, including interactions involving children (such as relevant parts 
of family law). (I return to the complicated categories below; women and servants.) And yet also they 
(those incapable of voting) are members of the people, which is why we need a distinction between “active” 
and “passive” citizens, where this distinction tracks whether or not citizens are deemed capable of taking 
active part in the legal-political process concerning legislation (voting). Moreover, Kant emphasizes that also 
passive citizens must be facing a totality of institutions where their possibility of working themselves into 
a condition of true independence (active citizenship with voting rights) is neither made illegal (those who 
can vote on laws cannot posit a law, according to which it is illegal for all citizens to work themselves into 
an active condition) nor made subject to another (private) citizen’s choice.
After having outlined these ideas of the state and of the citizen—and I return to them in more detail 
below—Kant moves on to describe various other aspects of the public authority, or the liberal legal-political 
institutional framework. It is especially with regard to these sections I believe that Kant, as mentioned 
above, views his account of public right as somewhat incomplete and less worked out than one might 
ultimately expect and want in a theory of justice. Although incomplete, Kant does provide some help as 
we try to complete the theory, however. Most importantly, perhaps, is Kant’s suggestion that we can draw 
a distinction between five different public right elements constitutive of the legal-political institutional 
framework of the just state. He gives each aspect its own quick discussion in short sections entitled, 
simply, sections “A” through “E.” In short, in section A we find a brief discussion of what he calls the three 
forms of state (autocracy, aristocracy, and democracy) as well as an argument for why we cannot have 
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a right to revolution (MM 6: 318-23); in section B, we find an argument for why the public authority 
cannot own anything as private property as well as some arguments concerning the state’s right to legally 
regulate systems such as those concerning land, the economy, and the financial system (MM 6: 323-25); in 
section C we find some arguments concerning the state’s role in relation to issues of poverty and religious 
institutions (MM 6: 325-28); in section D, we find some arguments concerning public offices and dignities 
(MM 6: 328-30); and, finally, in section E, we find a discussion of punishment and the granting of clemency 
(MM 6: 331-37).
As with Kant’s account of private right, his account of domestic public right has given rise to a host of 
interpretive disagreements.12 In addition to divergence of interpretation regarding each of the public right 
principles or ideas, there is significant discussion concerning both how to understand the category of 
public right as a whole as distinct from and related to the category of private right as well as how this (ideal) 
account is related to (non-ideal) considerations concerning national, historical particularity and problems 
issuing from our warped wood (our more nasty sides). Regarding the first question (how the category of 
public right relates to the category of private right), prudential accounts proceed in a libertarian manner 
and argue for something like a minimal state (since the state’s justification is simply that it does better what 
individuals in principle can do, but are so terribly bad at doing on their own in the state of nature); or they 
take decisive steps away from such libertarian parameters and instead appeal to various kinds of needs or 
welfare considerations so as to justify a more socio-economically expansive Kantian state; or they proceed 
in realist, legal positivist directions where the state can and will do whatever it takes so as to bring about a 
stable, rule-governed society; or they proceed in more democratic legal positivist directions by arguing that 
what matters is that the rules have sufficient, actual support in the people. In contrast, the non-prudential 
(ideal) interpretations disagree not only with these approaches but also among themselves on the question 
of whether or not Kant thinks that because the state must establish the monopoly on coercion, it must 
also establish a new set of systemic rights and duties for the citizens beyond those needed to establish the 
tripartite public authority and the basic public administrative institutional framework. Those scholars who 
answer “yes” on this question typically proceed to argue that various kinds of socio-economic rights, such 
as rights to poverty relief or unemployment benefits should be understood as systemic rights, meaning 
public right-claims citizens have on their own public institutions (only) and not with regard to each other 
as private citizens. Regarding the second question concerning how Kant’s ideal theory relates to non-ideal 
considerations of various kinds, such as historical particularity and reform, there is currently a lot less 
discussion in the literature, and, as mentioned in the introduction, this is the main area with regard to 
which the present paper aims to make a new contribution.
Before giving some reasons why I believe these non-ideal issues are important to attend to, let me locate 
my approach to Kant’s theory of right within this interpretive web—an approach that may be labeled a 
liberal republican interpretation—as well as indicate why I believe that there is nothing in my account 
(the arguments themselves, at least) that cannot be accepted by any liberal account (whether of a libertarian, 
legal-positivist, Rawlsian etc. kind) even if they may want to add other arguments so as to yield different 
conclusions regarding specific issues. On the one hand, I defend (elsewhere) an interpretation along the 
ideal, more complex lines regarding private right. More specifically, I argue (with and for Kant) that there 
are both ideal problems of indeterminacy regarding the general specification of the private right principles 
and regarding the application in particular cases as well as ideal problems of assurance that only the public 
authority can solve, namely in virtue of being the (only) means through which we can provide (general 
and specific) determinations of the general principles of right that are rightfully enforceable. Each problem 
(which is conceived of as impossible to solve even by persons with perfectly virtuous intentions in the 
state of nature) is then linked to the three-fold nature of the public authority (respectively): the sovereign 
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legislative (general specification, or positing of laws) authority, the judiciary (particular specification, 
or application of laws), and the executive authority (assurance, or actual upholding of laws). The public 
authority is therefore not yet another private person, but a public person or institution through which 
we enable rightful interaction among ourselves, including rightful coercion. This is why it is only through 
establishing the public authority that we can solve the problems that in principle are unsolvable in the state 
of nature, that is, the problems of indeterminacy (the general and particular specification, or the positing and 
application of law) as well as the problem of assurance (upholding the law by force as a moral, or justifiable 
fact) in a way reconcilable with respecting one another’s innate right to freedom. The establishment of the 
public authority makes possible enforceable rights (without wrongdoing), or conclusive rights.13
My interpretive approach also follows the more complex, ideal liberal lines of interpretation concerning 
public right.14 Hence, on my interpretation, part of what is distinctive about Kant’s approach to justice is 
that his account of public right includes separate arguments concerning systemic right. It is in virtue of this 
feature that his position can make good sense of various types of rights tracking socio-economic distributive 
issues, systemic issues that otherwise are hard to make sense of in liberal theory since they are difficult to 
explain in terms of rights individuals have in relation to each other as private individuals. For example, 
Kant’s argument for why the state has a right and duty to guarantee unconditional poverty relief for all 
its citizens is that once the state assumes a monopoly on coercion (which it must), it must reconcile this 
monopoly on coercion with each citizen’s innate right to freedom. The innate right to freedom is a right 
to independence from having the possibility of freedom subjected to another person’s arbitrary choices 
and instead subjected only to universal law, and the only way to do this is by securing unconditional, 
legal access to means for each citizen. Indeed, as we saw above, this is also exactly how Kant explains the 
idea of citizens’ independence above, namely as centrally involving the idea “of owning his existence and 
preservation to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth, not to the choice of another 
among the people.” (MM 6: 314)15
Finally on these interpretive points, it seems to me that these (private and public right) arguments of 
Kant’s can be accepted by any liberal, including rightwing libertarian positions, even if some of them 
may want to add other arguments. The account and arguments below concerning Kant’s conception of 
self-governance and especially the related discussion of public representation are, I believe, also of this sort: 
they can be accepted by any liberal account, that is, any account compatible with the ultimate reference of 
justification of coercion in a legal-political system being each person’s innate right to freedom understood 
in terms of private independence and equal subjection to universal laws.16 And they may be tempted to 
do this because the resulting account provides at least an interesting, contemporary way of giving due 
consideration also to various non-ideal considerations, such as our national-historical particularity and 
systemic injustice. In addition, the account also enables us to say something more about which kinds of 
institutions we must strive to establish so as to ensure that our legal-political frameworks not only are 
reconcilable with the basic liberal idea of the state as enabling rightful interaction between its citizens as 
free, equal, and independent, but as how a people so committed may seek to reform their institutions so as 
to enable conditions in which everyone can flourish through their own efforts. The fact that Kant does not 
identify democracy as a form of state that is constitutive of all minimally just states is, I will also suggest, 
a strength rather than a weakness of his account.
3. PART II: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND REFORM
One reason why it’s hard to identify the outlines of Kant’s idea of self-governance is simply that nowhere 
does he provide us with terribly much help to understand it. In fact, as mentioned above, Kant judged his 
most mature published account of public right (in the Doctrine of Right) as incomplete in this regard. 
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In addition, in the relevant segments of his text it is often less than obvious if Kant views his conclusions 
as holding regardless of whether or not we include in our reflections non-ideal assumptions concerning 
human nature, including concerning our social17 and crooked (vicious)18 aspects. Hence, sometimes Kant 
seems to argue in ways that are clearly intended only to appeal to considerations of reciprocal external 
freedom and to people who really do or only want to interact in ways consistent with respecting each 
others’ innate right to freedom. Other times, however, Kant somewhat surprisingly appeals to human 
nature, including the historical, particular condition a state or people finds itself in, before proceeding to 
make (sometimes, seemingly very provocative) claims about how we should think about interaction given 
such conditions. For example, Kant (infamously) seems to say things like: even if we judge the conditions 
in which we find ourselves horribly unjust, we still must obey the public authority, and that some people 
(richer men) are, as the saying goes, “more equal than others” (as mentioned above: the poor, women) and 
this is why only the former (richer men) get to vote. Hence, in these kinds of passages it looks as if Kant 
contradicts all his ideal talk about equal rights to freedom understood in terms of independence; after all, 
here he seems to say that, somehow, we can be (and some are) morally obliged to accept being treated as 
unfree, as unequals, and as privately dependent on others in our exercise of freedom. Also confusing to 
any Kant interpretation is the fact that it is not easy to clarify exactly what form of state Kant thinks can 
issue political obligations—monarchies, aristocracies, democracies only, or?
A main aim in the section below is to address these interpretive issues. To do this, I first (section 2.1 
“How Freedom Accommodates Human Nature in Kant’s Doctrine of Right”) defend the interpretive 
assumption that Kant remains firmly committed to the idea that although ideal theories of justice as 
freedom can and sometimes should make space for non-ideal considerations concerning our human nature 
(including historical particularity and our tendency to do evil things), they cannot let such contingent 
(non-ideal) considerations set the framework for non-contingent (ideal) considerations. I finish this section 
by suggesting that according to Kant, the idea of the just state (the republic) is compatible with all three 
forms of state—autocracies (monarchies), aristocracies, and democracies—and not only one of them. 
With these two interpretive assumptions at hand, I continue (in section 2.2 “Reforming Minimally Just 
States”) to argue that we can now make quite good sense of both an idea of a minimally just state within 
Kant’s framework and his idea of reforming such a minimally just state into a more flourishing, ideal version 
of it. I argue that Kant can be seen as defending a coherent position without giving up any of the (often 
presumed incompatible) elements he proposes in various works, such as: that the three possible forms 
of state can come in four different versions (anarchy, despotism, barbarism, and the republic) depending 
on how force, freedom, and law are unified in a particular state; that only the republic combines force and 
freedom in such a way that the enforced law can successfully establish rightful conditions; that a just states 
can distinguish between active and passive citizenship; and, finally, the idea that citizens govern themselves 
through public reason in well-functioning, or flourishing just states. The resulting position is, I propose, 
also a promising way of seeing how ideal and non-ideal considerations can work together when analyzing 
particular issues concerning the way in which public, representative self-governance is constitutive of rightful 
interaction in a flourishing republic, namely a state where “law itself rules and depends on no particular 
person… [where there is] a system representing the people, in order to protect its rights in its name, by all 
the citizens united and acting through their delegates (deputies).” (MM 6: 341)19
3.1. How Freedom Accommodates Human Nature in Kant’s Doctrine of Right
Before going into specifics regarding how Kant envisions public self-governance in just states, let me 
provide some reasons to read Kant as maintaining that the idea of the just state itself is comprised of ideas 
that do not appeal to our human nature (non-ideal considerations), that is, neither to concerns regarding 
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our natural sociability (and particular histories) nor to the empirically universal20 fact that we act badly 
at times. Instead, I will suggest, Kant views it as essential for a theory of justice to make space for such 
non-ideal considerations while remaining firmly committed to the idea that the non-ideal should not set 
the framework for the ideal, but the other way around. And for good reasons: freedom cannot be ideally, 
coercively limited by anything but considerations of freedom itself—any other limits must be considered 
fundamentally contingent, and hence also correctible, over time, namely as conditions of freedom become 
more firmly established in a state.
Time and time again in the Doctrine of Right, Kant emphasizes that his principles of right (justice) are 
a priori principles and that the core ideas of right, such as those of the state and of a citizen, are pure ideas 
of reason (MM 6: 313). Similarly, Kant makes it clear at the beginning of his discussion of public right that 
however well disposed and… [right-loving]21 men might be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition 
(one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established individual human beings, peoples, and 
states can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems right 
and good to it and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this. (MM 6: 312) 
Although there is much we may disagree about in this passage, what seems clear is that Kant’s argument 
is supposed to go through even without appeals to our human nature, meaning our actually being well 
disposed and deeply devoted to what is right (“right-loving”). This is not to say that Kant does not consider 
concerns and problems of justice that are grounded in our human nature (again, our natural sociability and 
our propensities to do evil) as relevant to justice. It is only to say that Kant’s account of the just state—the 
arguments comprising his ideal critical standard—should succeed in yielding a coherent, critical perspective 
of freedom without such non-ideal considerations.22
Attributing to Kant the view that non-ideal concerns (considerations of human nature) should not set 
the framework within which ideal concerns (those based on considerations of freedom) are given space, 
but the other way around, is not an interpretive stretch. In my view Kant explicitly makes exactly this point 
in his introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, where he says that:
… moral anthropology … deal[s]… with the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help 
them in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals. … It cannot be dispensed with, but it must not precede a 
metaphysics of morals or be mixed with it; for one would then run the risk of bringing forth false or at least indulgent 
moral laws, which would misrepresent as unattainable what has only not been attained just because the law has 
not been seen and presented in its purity (in which its strength consists) or because spurious or impure incentives 
were used for what is itself in conformity with duty and good. This would leave no certain moral principles, either 
to guide judgment or to discipline the mind in observance of duty, the precepts of which must be given a priori 
by pure reason alone. (MM 6: 217)
What we see here in this quote from the introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, then, is that Kant is 
most concerned with not giving features concerning our human nature (both our natural sociality and our 
propensity to evil) a role where they get to determine which arguments concerning right that are ideally 
justifiable to beings like us, beings capable of freedom and moral responsibility. Freedom can only be 
limited in the name of freedom—and so is restricted to considerations of reciprocal freedom—and any 
arguments grounded in human nature (good and bad) are fundamentally contingent, and so cannot set the 
framework for freedom (free choices). Arguments concerning human nature are non-ideal or conditional 
(in that they presuppose certain ends) and so cannot set the framework for the ideal or the unconditional 
(what we can all accept as justifiable merely in virtue of being committed to respect one another’s right 
to set ends of our own).23
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This general approach gains further interpretive support in Kant’s anthropological and historical works 
where Kant talks about related issues; also in these works there is little doubt that Kant thinks of the realization 
of just societies as a slow endeavor and not as something that is easy to accomplish or as something that we 
will necessarily succeed in doing. For example, in the Anthropology, Kant spends a significant amount of time 
emphasizing the slowness of developing the human predispositions to good to its fullest, including because 
it is both something we must do together and something that requires education (A 7: 322-30). Moreover, 
it follows from what Kant says there that if he makes claims concerning history or moral anthropology 
that are mistaken (and so wrongly makes space for them in his ideal theory of justice), then this can and 
should be corrected. Kant is not only worried that others may make mistakes, in other words, but also that 
he might be making mistakes by “misrepresent[ing] as unattainable what has only not been attained just 
because the law has not been seen and presented in its purity.” (MM 6: 217) And this problem of mistakes 
(bad judgment) is one main reason why it is so important that freedom (the unconditioned) is what sets 
the framework of justice, and not the contingent facts (including historical and anthropological ones) that 
such an ideal theory of freedom must make space for.
Moral anthropology deals with various aspects of us that concern our human nature. As mentioned, in 
the Religion Kant views human nature as comprising a threefold “original predisposition to good in human 
nature,” namely as comprising one predisposition to animality, one to humanity, and one to personality. 
(R 6: 26ff, cf. CPrR 5: 73)24 This is not the place to go into too much detail about this, but let me say a few 
words about this point more generally before suggesting one way to understand it as informing some of Kant’s 
comments about historical development and philosophical anthropology and peoples in his legal-political 
writings. To start, Kant’s basic suggestion is that issues concerning our natural drives to self-preservation, sex, 
and affectionate social unions with others are to be understood in terms of our predisposition to animality; 
our susceptibility to consider and being considered as valuable by others through the predisposition to 
humanity; and finally, our susceptibility to recognize the need reflectively to consider the morality of our 
actions through the predisposition to personality. In addition, the extent to which reason is required to realize 
each of these predispositions differs: the first (to animality) doesn’t require reason as such (although we 
do also these things consciously); the second (to humanity) involves comparative uses of reason; whereas 
the final one (to personality) inherently involves full-blown (self-reflective) uses of reason.25
It is because of the third predisposition, to personality, Kant furthermore suggests, that we are able to 
act in morally responsible ways, namely by using self-reflective powers of reason to act rightfully and/or 
virtuously, including by correcting bad realizations of the first two predispositions. More specifically, 
when we do so correct from the point of view of right (ensure that we act rightfully), Kant argues, we 
evaluate whether or not our actions are consistent with respecting each person’s innate right to freedom 
(and corresponding private and public rights) as described in his ideal legal-political writings, whereas 
when we correct from the point of view of ethics (virtue), we consider whether or not the maxims of our 
actions can be universalized as described in his ideal writings on ethics and virtue—and act as motivated 
by this reflection. Finally, it seems clear that developmentally, Kant’s proposal is that although we do all 
things consciously, we first succeed in starting to master the animalistic capacity, then we start mastering 
the capacity for humanity, whereas the reflective capacity enabling personality is the slowest one we 
master. It takes quite a long time, in other words, for us to develop the ability to be morally responsible, 
whereas the abilities to seek nutrition and to love someone affectively (as enabled by the predisposition 
to animality) and to have a sense of oneself through other’s affirmation of us as who we are (as enabled by 
the predisposition to humanity) are more easily realized (developmentally).
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If we view this account as informing Kant’s conceptions of peoples, nations, and national development, it 
seems that we can utilize the accounts of the predispositions to animality and humanity—and in particular 
as it relates to our sociality—to explain how we naturally and affectionately love the society (or people) 
and/or country (or nation) into which we happen to be born and how we want to develop its culture. This is 
because on this kind of position, our sociality is enabled by our capacities for animality and humanity, or 
the unreflective and comparative, emotional orientations linked to our basic sense of being at home in 
the world and to others as being oriented towards us as mattering. Hence, this capability for animality is 
linked to our sense of some particular persons, such as our families and friends, being ours, but also how 
the society in which we are brought up, assuming this is an uncomplicated upbringing, is affectionately 
related to as our society or, when larger, people or nation. That we are so oriented, as such, is not a problem. 
This is just the kind of embodied, social beings we are and it is consistent with what we upon reflection can 
justify. After all, that I affectionately only love my loved ones (my spouse, my children, my friends) is not 
inconsistent with morally loving everyone—treating all humans with respect and as possessing dignity—
just like my loving my people or country is consistent with my utmost respect (moral love) for all other 
countries and all peoples as well. Hence, loving one’s persons or one’s people or country affectionately is 
something we can affirm upon reflection; there is nothing wrong with be so emotionally oriented, as such; 
in fact, quite the opposite.26 As long as such national affection and related culture (and cultural differences) 
is developed within a moral framework, including legal frameworks based on respecting each citizen’s 
innate right to freedom and respect for other states’ autonomy as well, there is nothing wrong with such 
national affections and national-cultural affections and identities. Rather, given human moral psychology 
and corresponding philosophical anthropology, this is as it is for us. The mistake is only to view, as we will 
see in more detail below, these personal, social, and cultural affections as the sources of morality—of what 
can be justified to all, and so to be done in the name of freedom—for that they are not. Finally, on this point, 
it also seems relatively unproblematic to say that it takes human societies a long time too to develop from 
being focused on basic survival and a sense of safety (“animality”), to being able to cultivate a flourishing 
culture (“humanity”), to being able to enable and secure conditions of freedom for all, including through 
legal-political institutions (“personality”) (A 7: 322-5).
Why, then, do we or are we so extremely likely to get this wrong, including by easily being profoundly 
confused about some or all of this, at least sometimes? Answering this question brings us to the other aspect 
of Kant’s non-ideal account, namely the one that deals with our propensity to evil, which is also addressed 
in his Religion. Kant here explains that our human nature includes a propensity to evil, meaning that our 
natures are extremely liable to being corrupted due to problems resulting from our ability to choose (also 
unwisely). The problem, then, is that our sensuous receptivity enabled by the first two predispositions 
(to animalistic pleasures and feelings of interpersonal power) in combination with our capacity to choose 
gives rise to temptations to do something simply because it feels very pleasant or empowering (especially 
in the moment); a (perverted) sense of freedom. Hence, Kant argues, our ability to choose in combination 
with our sensuous receptivity give rise to problems from “weakness of will” (lapses where we yield to the 
temptation of pleasure or senses of empowerment in the moment) to “impure incentives” (doing the right 
thing from the wrong incentive) to “perverted hearts” (structuring our lives in self-and other-destructive 
ways). The problems issuing from our propensity to evil obviously remains a constant threat for any moral, 
and so also any justice seeking, project. Indeed, as Kant explains in the Anthropology, our propensity to 
evil remains a constant source of threat also for civil society:
In a civil constitution, which is the highest degree of artificial improvement of the human species’ good predisposition 
to the final end of its destiny, animality still manifests itself earlier and, at bottom, more powerfully than pure 
humanity.... The human being’s self-will is always ready to break out in aversion toward his neighbor, and he always 
presses his claim to unconditional freedom; freedom not merely to be independent of others, but even to be master 
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over other beings who by nature are equal to him… This is because nature within the human being strives to lead 
him from culture to morality, and not (as reason prescribes) beginning with morality and its law, to lead him to a 
culture designed to be appropriate to morality. This inevitably establishes a perverted, inappropriate tendency: for 
example, when religious instruction, which necessarily should be a moral culture, begins with historical culture, 
which is merely the culture of memory, and tries in vain to deduce morality from it. (A 7: 327-8)
Of course, Kant’s example here is how the combination of the early development of our existentially 
powerful capacities to animality and humanity and the vices that our capacity to choose (and so our wanting 
to feel absolutely free or powerful) are internally linked to the common fact that religious instruction 
understands itself as beginning with “historical culture” rather than with “moral culture,” or what can be 
justified to morally responsible beings (persons).27 That is to say, religious instruction (as an actual practice) 
often understands and presents itself as having its justification in the culture of memory (historical culture) 
in which it is situated rather than in virtue of being justifiable to such cultural (social beings) who are also 
capable of moral responsibility (true freedom). This mistaken approach—doing religion in such a way—is 
terribly tempting to us because of the way in which doing it this way feeds our propensity to evil, namely 
a sense of importance (being part of some grand, historical enterprise much better than all the rest) or of 
being inherently better than others rather than interact with everyone as equals (in ways respectful of our 
inherited, cultural differences). Of course, the same can be said of nations: a problem with some forms of 
bad nationalism is that it purports to justify the claim that one’s nation is better than others and that the 
inherited culture (whatever it is taken to be) sets the framework for freedom rather than the other way around. 
And then, in vain, those political leaders who participate in public life in this way, try to argue that there 
are these special Norwegian, French, British, American, etc. (or what is also common, “Western”) values 
that somehow set the framework for permissible exercises of freedom in one’s own particular nation, rather 
than maintaining what is justifiable, namely that our shared, capacity for freedom (moral responsibility) 
is what always must set the framework within which any claims to accommodation of cultural difference 
must (justifiably) be made.28
3.2. Reforming Minimally Just States
In order to understand what Kant means by saying that we must reform our inherited, non-ideal states 
into better realizations of them, it is useful to clarify what, for Kant, a state is at all (whether imperfect 
or perfect) when it issues political obligations. To do this, as suggested above, it seems fruitful to draw 
a distinction between a minimally just state (imperfect realization of the idea of the state) and a more 
flourishing state (the civil condition more fully realized). And to do this, in turn, a good starting point is 
Kant’s concepts of anarchy, despotism, barbarism, and the republic in the Anthropology, since with this 
analysis at hand, we can understand more clearly the related arguments presented in the related domestic 
public right section of the Doctrine of Right. In short, my suggestion below is that although anarchy need 
not be a condition of injustice (since it can be merely a condition devoid of justice), only the republic is the 
civil condition (can issue political obligations) since only it contains the basic legal-political institutional 
framework needed for reform to do the work necessary to realize the civil condition more fully. This account 
also helps us understand why Kant suggests that when we succeed in reforming our states, we improve the 
functioning of the legal-political institutional framework in certain ways. He also gives us good reasons 
to be weary of any appeals to human nature to justify inequalities regarding actual rights, namely so as to 
ensure we’re not misrepresenting as unattainable or even wrong what only (at best) our own prejudices, 
insecurities, and vulnerabilities have kept us blind to. This is why, as we saw above, Kant maintains that 
the account as a whole must always have a structure, according to which human freedom cannot be justly 
limited by human nature. It is also why, as mentioned above, we should look at the areas of public right 
labelled sections A through E in the Doctrine of Right for clues regarding which institutional structures 
we should pay special attention to as we seek to reform our imperfect states.29
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3.2.1. The three forms of the state
Turning first to the issue of the ideal forms of state, Kant thinks that there isn’t only one possible form, 
but three. Hence, it is mistaken to think that his analysis of the minimally just state starts on the assumption 
that it must be a democracy. Kant is explicit in the Doctrine of Right that the idea of the tripartite public 
authority (legislative, judicial, executive authority) as representing the general, united will of the people 
can be understood as held by or entrusted to one person (autocracy: one active citizen), by a few persons 
(aristocracy: a few active citizens), or by many (democracy: many active citizens) (MM 6: 338f).30 In the 
Anthropology Kant argues similarly. Here he makes this point in connection with arguing that force, freedom, 
and law maybe combined in four different ways, yielding anarchy, barbarism, despotism, and the republic. 
Having clarified this, Kant proceeds by pointing out that “only the last combination [republic] deserves 
to be called a true civil constitution; by which, however, one does not have in view one of the three forms 
of state (democracy), but understands by republic only a state as such.” (A 7: 331) I will return to this 
passage momentarily, but for now notice that each of the three forms of state can be realized as the civil 
condition—as a republic—and hence the minimally just state (the one that can issue political obligations) 
does not necessarily come in the democratic form.
Correspondingly, in the Doctrine of Right Kant ends his discussion of domestic public right by emphasizing 
the kind of patience we need to have in our justice seeking projects, namely to reform our (typically 
inherited) imperfectly just states—whichever form they have—into more flourishing republics, where the 
“pure idea” of the state is sought realized through some good ideals of it. (MM 6: 340f) A hard question 
for any interpretation, therefore, is to figure out what Kant means by saying that each of the different 
forms of state can be realized as republics, and how actually to go about doing this. My suggestion below 
is that states with any of these forms of state are republics because they can be reformed into better and 
better means through which a people realize justice together through public self-governance. The reform 
consists mostly in making the public legal-political structure increasingly representative in its operations, 
including by how we, over time, rid the public systems of hereditary, non-merit based privileges and also 
make it actually possible for everyone to work their way into taking active part in the public life of the state 
through facilitating social mobility.
3.2.2. The four possible combinations of force, freedom, and law: anarchy, despotism, barbarism, and republic
Kant’s idea of the imperfectly, yet minimally just states is easiest to get a handle on by utilizing his comments 
in the Anthropology regarding the four different ways in which freedom, law, and force can be combined. 
Since this is an important piece of text, let me start by quoting Kant somewhat extensively on this point:
Freedom and law (by which freedom is limited) are the main pivots around which civil legislation turns. – But in 
order for law to be effective and not an empty recommendation, a middle term must be added; namely, force, which, 
when connected with freedom, secures success for these principles. Now we can conceive of four combinations 
of force with freedom and law:
A. Law and freedom without force (anarchy).
B. Law and force without freedom (despotism).
C. Force without freedom and law (barbarism).
D. Force with freedom and law (republic).
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One sees that only the last combination deserves to be called a true civil constitution; by which, however, one 
does not have in view one of the three forms of state (democracy), but understands by republic only a state as 
such. (A 7: 330f)
The state of nature, as noted above, does not have to be a condition of injustice, but it will be a condition 
that is at best devoid of justice. It is clearly this situation Kant appeals to with his concept of “anarchy” here: 
We can imagine a situation in which everyone happens to agree on the general (positing) and particular 
(application) specification of the principles of right, and consequently they never experience any (reasonable 
or unreasonable) disagreement regarding how their exercises of freedom should be restricted when they 
interact. In such a situation, there would naturally also be no wrongful uses of coercion; after all, there would 
never be any use of coercion whatsoever. This would be the best possible anarchical situation, and so one 
in which we have not enabled justice (since rightful uses of coercion are impossible in this condition) but 
also one in which there is also no injustice; it is simply a condition “devoid of justice,” as Kant argues in the 
Doctrine of Right, since if there arises any (reasonable or unreasonable) disputes concerning right “there 
would be no judge competent to render a verdict having rightful force.” (MM 6: 312) The only condition 
worse than the state of nature so conceived (anarchy) is one in which there is much use of force, but no 
freedom and no law securing rights for all citizens (barbarism). In such a barbaric condition, the use of 
force is not restricted by considerations of freedom and law; there is only brute force (violence), which 
is why Kant calls it a barbaric condition. Both of these conditions are therefore not even minimally just; 
one (“anarchy”) is (necessarily) devoid of justice, the other one (“barbarism”) is (necessarily) only unjust.
The two other possible conditions are, respectively, “despotism” and the “republic” (civil condition), 
according to Kant. Both combine force with law, but despotism does not combine force with freedom, and 
so cannot succeed in realizing both freedom and law, which are the “pivots around which civil legislation 
turns.” Despotism, then, is a condition characterized by law and force, but there is no freedom because 
there is no representation even in the most basic sense of the word since there are neither any active 
citizens in this condition nor is the basic right to freedom secured. On the one hand, therefore, a main 
problem is that the those wielding power take themselves as holding this power as private persons rather 
than as public officials representing the people who are entrusted to act on behalf of the people so as to 
enable rightful, lawful interactions between each other as free, equal, and independent. There is, in other 
words, no public authority in a despotic condition, only private authority. In despotic societies, some 
person(s) holds power in a way that it is fundamentally not representative (of the people and their rights) 
in nature, and hence there is no path (as yet) internal to the principles of the legal-political institutional 
system itself, whereby conclusively rightful relations is or can be secured. More specifically, in a despotic 
autocracy only one person is, in a despotic aristocracy a few persons, and in a despotic democracy a subset 
of the citizens view themselves as having and actually have subjected all others to her or his private choice 
(to laws of her/his choosing). This is why, in despotic societies there is no freedom, but force and law 
only, since there is only private power: one or more private individuals de facto subject everyone else to 
their private choices regarding which laws that are to be followed rather than laws constitutive of enabling 
rightful interactions among the subjects as free, equal, and independent. That is to say, in such a society, 
there are laws in the sense of a rule-governed legal-political institutional framework—there is security in 
this sense—but not one that is based on the protection of all citizens as free and equal, and so in terms of 
the citizens’ basic right to freedom with its corresponding innate, private, and public rights. Despotism 
is therefore not a civil condition, since only provisional justice is possible within it—which occurs each 
time there is agreement and no use of coercion or when the laws in effect can be seen as instantiations of 
the general principles of innate, private, and public right (like with anarchy)—and hence such a condition 
cannot issue political obligations. Because there is force used in this (despotic) condition, however, it is 
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necessarily a condition of injustice. Still, because there is rule-governed stability in this society and since 
one does not have a right to use violence against others, it is often prudent and wise to work within it to 
strive towards the establishment of civil society.
The republic, in contrast, is a condition where force is combined with freedom and law such that force 
“secures success for these principles” (of freedom and law), which is why only the republic involves the 
establishment of a public authority. A key here is that the persons wielding power in this condition are 
not (by law) anything but representatives of the people, namely by being fulfilling their role as genuinely 
public persons. The highest public authority in the republic is functionally and institutionally tripartite, and, 
relatedly, the one or ones who are legally recognized as entitled to vote on the laws is the active citizen(s). 
Correspondingly, of course, in such a state, those with voting powers simply specify the innate, private, 
and public laws of freedom that regulate interaction and all public officials are required to strive towards 
analysing public matters and wield public authority in an inherently public way, namely in line with the public 
policies governing their public offices as well as with ideas of the citizens as free, equal, and independent. 
In the republic public officials only take themselves to be acting and are only legally authorized to act on 
behalf of each and all citizens, and in line with the relevant laws and policies regarding how this is to be 
done. The public officials are not legally entitled to view their offices of authority as private spheres of power 
and choices; when the public offices are treated in this (private) way, they are viewed (including legally) as 
being corrupted. The republic is the only legal-political condition, in which the citizens enjoy basic rights 
of freedom (as force is delineated by means of these rights) and so the only one compatible with reform 
actually leading to a condition where the people govern themselves through their public legal-political 
institutions. That is to say, once reform has succeeded, in such a state all morally responsible citizens can 
work themselves into a condition where they actively can participate in the public institutional framework, 
including by partaking in informed ways in public reason generally and by holding any of the public offices 
(become active citizens); this is where the people rule themselves through public law and this possibility 
does not depend on any particular person.
If the above analysis is correct, then as soon as the legal-political framework of the minimally just state 
is in place, then political obligations exist and the task of reform starts. And to sum up, the minimally just 
state is in place when the public authority itself is established as a tripartite, public authority that represents 
the people in virtue of securing their basic rights to freedom (their innate, private, and public rights). 
As emphasized above, this (minimal condition) is compatible with legislative authority being held by 
only one person (a monarch as the only active citizen), by only a few (an aristocracy delimiting the small 
group of active citizens), or by many (democracy where many act as active citizens); the only crucial point 
is that the three elements of the public authority must be institutionally distinct, must be representational 
in character, and aim simply ruling through specification, application, and enforcement of each citizen’s 
basic rights (to freedom). In none of these republics, are those entrusted with public authority legally 
recognized as ruling the people by their private choices. Rather, the one, the few, or the many recognized 
as active citizen(s) in virtue of being able to vote on the specification of the laws (legislative authority) 
and all those who are holding the other two highest public offices (judiciary and executive authorities) are 
viewed as legally entrusted to represent the people by reasoning in specific ways as they apply or enforce the 
posited laws of freedom regulating the people’s interactions. Moreover, the basic rights that are specified 
in a minimally just state include each citizen’s innate, inalienable right to freedom, which includes legally 
guaranteed a right to each category of innate right (such as right to one’s body and to freedom of speech), 
of private right (private property, contract, and status right), and of public rights concerning the systems 
upon which her or his exercise of freedom is made dependent by the establishment of the state’s monopoly 
on coercion (such as movement across land, unconditional poverty relief, access to trade in an economy 
and with legal tender, recognized as equal subject to the law etc.31).
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It seems important to reiterate that that in the minimally just state it is possible that pretty much everyone 
are what Kant calls “passive” citizens, since they cannot vote on the legislation or cannot take direct part 
in the running of the public authority—and because this is where the power to determine exactly how 
to limit freedom in the name of freedom, they are passive subjects rather than active members of the 
state. Let me explain this from a somewhat different direction: above, we saw that Kant defines a citizen 
in terms of freedom, equality, and independence, and that he distinguishes between active and passive 
citizens by virtue of whether or not they are given full freedom, which ultimately is to have a right to vote 
on the actual laws governing their interactions with one another. The reason for this two-fold distinction, 
Kant argues, is that being an active citizen requires that one is “fit to vote” (6: 314) although, as we have 
seen, it cannot be illegal for anyone to work themselves into active citizenship. At the same time, Kant 
maintains, the sovereign authority may as a matter of legal fact simply not be open up for anyone other than 
those who already have sovereign power or be legally recognized as having the right to attain it: sovereign 
(legislative) and/or other public authority may be restricted to only one person and its descendants (as in 
a hereditary monarchy), or a few families (hereditary aristocracy), or some group of citizens (like only 
sufficiently wealthy male citizens), whereas all the rest are obliged to obey as mere subjects. In the latter 
case, a minimally just state may be a democratic state where almost everyone are “passive” citizens because 
of their lack of the means required to be independent (“active” citizen). Because they do not have sufficient 
means (lack the necessary ability) to live independently of others, they are dependent upon others’ means 
(including powers) to gain access to a good livelihood.32 And, as we saw above, this means that until they 
rid themselves of this dependence through work, they may not, on this theory, have a right to vote. Again, 
the only legal condition that must be fulfilled in such a society where most people are poor, according 
to Kant, is, again, that “anyone can work his [one’s] way up from this passive condition to an active one” 
(MM 6: 315).33 So, where the socio-economic conditions are such that many people can only obtain a 
livelihood by making themselves dependent on others in these ways (become servants), it must still be 
possible for them to work themselves out of such a condition.
Kant’s judgement, therefore, is that although a lack of material independence for large groups of the 
population is a real worry for the minimally just state—a core issue to address as it reforms itself—as long 
as social climbing is not illegal and as long as any factors holding climbing back is based on considerations 
of human nature, the result does not deprive anyone of their basic rights.34 Hence, given this legal 
framework (of freedom), considerations of prudence (in response to considerations of our human nature, 
here complicated material circumstances of a people) can play their stabilizing role. Given the particular 
historical circumstances a state finds itself in, that is to say, and given that what is being stabilized is not 
inherently unjust and can be reformed into a more flourishing version, considerations of prudence are 
permissible or acceptable. Similarly, in the Doctrine of Right, Kant argues that notions of inherited “nobility 
of a country that is not under an aristocratic but a monarchical constitution is an institution… [that] may 
be permitted for a certain period of time and may even be necessary by circumstances. But it cannot be 
asserted that this estate can be established in perpetuity… a state has the right to alter its form (e.g. to 
reform itself into a republic35).” (MM 6: 370) In other words, for reasons of prudence and history (such 
as a society evolving from a feudal social structure), it may be prudentially necessary for the leaders of the 
state to give certain historically powerful families certain inherited public privileges, such as being the only 
ones who can become monarchs, marry monarchs, or sit in the monarch’s council or government. Since 
such a political leader’s (monarch) exercise of power is still through laws of freedom (law recognizing each 
citizen’s basic innate, private, and public rights) and since such a monarch (from a legal point of view) is a 
thoroughly public person (i.e. not a private person owning the nation’s wealth as private property), such 
discretionary or despotic political uses of power (in response to actual circumstances) is permissible for 
a limited period.36 For example, such an arrangement may be necessary to stabilize a society coming out 
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of periods of devastating civil wars. Nevertheless, this is not a legal-political practice strictly consistent 
with right—as it involves notions of hereditary (despotic) public power—and so it cannot be seen as a 
permanent, but only a “temporary” feature or an “accident” of the legal-political system (MM 6: 370). 
The notion of hereditary public privileges is contrary to an idea of the state reconcilable with each person 
right to freedom as spelled out through the idea of citizens as free, equal, and independent. Hence, as we 
will see more clearly below, ridding itself of hereditary public privileges is one main feature that reforming 
the minimally just state into its more flourishing versions consists in.37
3.2.3. Reform: eliminating inherited public power and increasing social mobility
Not just any monopoly on force can, then, yield political obligations on this account of justice, but 
something quite far away from a well-functioning civil society can do so. And the reason is, as suggested 
above, that as soon as the minimally just legal-political institutional framework is in place, what is required 
for the successful reform process to be possible also exists. The aim of such a reform process is to transform 
the minimally just state into a flourishing republic. As mentioned above, I believe that Kant’s suggestions 
of what this actually means is usually explored by looking at some of his reflections in sections A through 
D of domestic public right in the Doctrine of Right, reflections that are supported by relevant remarks 
also in other texts. More specifically, I start by engaging Kant’s discussions of reforming the tripartite, 
public authority itself (section A), including the reform of public offices and dignities (section D), before 
proceeding with a discussion of Kant’s notion of socio-economic mobility (sections B & C). I will use the 
cases of the United Kingdom and Norway to illustrate some of these points.
a) Reforming the Pubic Authority: Ridding It of Inherited Power
The issue of how to reform the public authority itself is one of the topics Kant discusses in section A of 
the Doctrine of Right (MM 6: 318-323), and it is also a topic he returns to towards the end of his discussion 
of public right (MM 6: 339-42) and in an appendix added after the publication of the Doctrine of Right 
(MM 6: 369-772). As mentioned earlier, Kant thinks that all we can require of the minimally just state is 
that the public authority is tripartite (legally distinguishes between the legislative, judiciary, and executive 
authority institutionally and functionally), representative (understand the public authority as a public, not 
private authority), and that it exercises its public authority by analysing legal-political issues through the 
laws of freedom based on the related ideas of citizens’ basic innate, private, and public rights. It is in virtue 
of these features that the minimally just state realizes public authority in terms of a “system representing 
the people” and that restricts exercises of freedom only in the name of freedom by subjecting interactions 
to laws of freedom (only).
One core problem with a state that is only minimally just in this way, however, is that the operations of 
the legal-political institutions depends on one, a few, or some person(s) since it is only one, a few, or some 
persons can be active citizens and so can hold higher public office, and especially the sovereign (legislative) 
power (whether a king, an aristocracy, or a group of citizens in a democracy) (6: 340). The state is not, in 
other words, functioning properly as a self-governing republic in all its legal-political institutional operations 
yet; some aspects of how it actually functions are despotic in nature. As noted above, this lack of proper 
public self-governance—these despotic elements—may be something we simply must accept for reasons of 
prudence for a limited period of time; it may be the best or only way to take the first steps out of a situation 
of civil war with its sheer brutal, devastating, and absolutely destructive violence. Yet, it is clear that this is 
not a condition we can envision as sustainable and justifiable in perpetuity, since the actual functioning of 
the highest public power is in tension with each person having an innate right to freedom. That is to say, 
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the form of the republic is not properly realized in such a constitutional document, by which, as we will 
see more clearly below, Kant means that the state always has the right to seek to rid it of any notions of 
inherited (despotic) public power and replace this with various kinds of merit-based considerations—or 
reform the minimally just republic (with many imperfectly republican or despotic, actual institutional 
principles) into a flourishing ideal of it (where the republican ideas of public self-government infuse the 
whole, actual function of the legal-political structure and its supporting public culture).
As we seek to reform our imperfect states, then, Kant keeps the worries concerning stability for the right 
reasons (being able to maintain the minimally just monopoly on coercion and yet develop it peacefully into 
something better) close at heart. This is, in my view, also why Kant proposes that the transforming of the 
sovereign authority must be a peaceful, consensual legal transformation—not on to be imposed by force 
from the top or “by the people acting as a mob.” (6: 340) Relatedly, Kant is quite clear that as the person or 
persons vested with sovereign power seeks to reform the sovereign authority, they cannot simply choose to
… reorganize itself from one of the three forms into another, as, for example, aristocrats agreeing to submit to 
autocracy or deciding to merge into a democracy, or the reverse, as if it rested on the sovereign’s free choice [freien 
Wahl] and discretion which kind of constitution it would subject the people to. For even if the sovereign decided 
to transform itself into a democracy, it could still do the people a wrong, since the people itself could abhor such 
a constitution and find one of the other forms more to its advantage. (MM 6: 340)
In other words, as those actually entrusted with sovereign power seek to improve the institution of the 
sovereign (legislative) power (in the ways they know, insofar as they are committed to justice, that they 
ought to do) and, of course, the rest of the public authority, they must work with the people in so doing. 
I take it that there are two main, complementary reasons for this: First, what the public officials are trying 
to do is to enable true freedom for the people such that inheritance does not determine who actually ends 
up being entrusted with sovereign (public) authority, but also so that everyone can take direct, active 
part in the operations of the public authority through informed, public discussions and through holding 
other public offices. Consequently the first step here must be giving the people a real say about what kind 
of form of state they want, including whether or not they want to keep the one they have. For example, a 
people may want to keep the monarchy since they find that the royalty fulfils a certain, important role with 
regard to political stability, and they may find that it is part of the nation’s history that they would like to 
continue, at least for now and until a good way of transcending it can be found. Second, changes in the basic 
legal-political structure concerning its basic form of state involves a dramatic change from something that 
works (at least minimally, given the people’s particular history and circumstances) to something that might 
not work and with which the state and its people are not yet familiar; it is, in other words, a risky project. 
Such an undertaking may easily do much more bad than good—radically destabilize the state—and so it 
is something those vested with public authority want to do with the people on their side or in response to 
the people becoming increasingly vocal about this change being what they want.38
It is important to remember, then, that the main aim is to make the actual operations of the public power 
truer to the idea of the state, namely such that the public authority is the means through which we act so 
as to enable rightful interactions between us as free, equal, and independent. The public authority, in other 
words, is not yet another private person, but it is, ideally, a representation of an “us” through which we 
act so as to bring about a kind of interaction we cannot in principle enable as individual private persons 
(regardless of how virtuous we individually strive to be). Hence, the main aim is to ensure that the public 
authority—or the legal-political institutional force—is not something linked to any particular person or 
family (inherited power), but is an authority with which any one of us can be entrusted as we become 
capable. And being entrusted with it means being entrusted to do our very best to ensure that the legal-
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political institutional system as a whole functions as it should and so become increasingly trustworthy for 
each and all. In addition, of course, it is only prudent, and hence actually stabilizing, to give certain families 
such privileges that do not track the family members’ (or people’s) actual ability (merit) to hold public 
offices if we find ourselves in certain extreme, unstable circumstances where these families actually are 
crucial to stabilize the situation. If one lets such practices concerning who is entrusted with public offices 
continue, as Kant says, they will “fall into the hands of sheer incompetence” (MM 6: 328); as conditions 
become better, there are no good reasons not to let the election or appointment to these offices track merit 
(actual, proven ability). Moreover, as we keep reforming our system, we do not want to get rid, but rather 
further develop the public officials’ ability to reason as our representatives, namely to analyse legal-political 
issues in terms of each citizen’s basic rights (innate, private, and public rights). To do this, of course, we 
also need to strive towards a legal-political culture where such reasoning is expected and encouraged in 
public discourse.39
Kant was, if not the first, then among the first to give a thoroughly freedom-based, rather complex account 
of public reason. Public reason includes what we saw above as the kinds of ideals that we, as citizens of 
liberal states, must hold those entrusted with public authority accountable to, as well as, of course, the 
ideals those vested with public power must uphold as they reason and uphold the rule of law (its positing 
in general terms, its application in particular cases, and its enforcement). In addition, however, public 
reason also concerns those who hold lower public offices and the ways they are required to reason (in that 
capacity), namely in ways determined by the public policies constitutive of their public office—something 
Kant slightly confusingly calls “private reason” in his “What Is Enlightenment?” essay.40 In section D of 
domestic public right, Kant undertakes the question of how to reform the minimally just state into a civil 
condition (true republic) by addressing the issue of how to reform lower level public offices and dignities 
(MM 6: 238-30). According to Kant, the sovereign authority has the right to distribute both public offices 
(or “salaried administrative positions”) as well as “dignities, which are eminent estates without pay, based on 
honor alone” (MM 6: 328).41 As with his discussion of the tripartite sovereign authority, central to Kant’s 
analysis regarding how to reform a minimally just state’s system of public officials lays in the idea of ridding 
the system of hereditary positions and honors. On the one hand, for the same reason that political prudence 
(stability) may have been a reason why some were given such positions and honors originally (when the 
state established its minimally just monopoly on coercion),42 prudence is also one major reason for giving 
it up as the situation improve.43 On the other hand, of course, we want to rid the system of such elements 
because they are inconsistent with right; no one is born an official or as more equal than others—and 
consequently, he argues, we correct this mistake by
… letting them [hereditary privileges]… lapse and not filling vacancies in these positions… So it has a provisional 
right to let these titled positions of dignity continue until even in public opinion the division into sovereign, 
nobility, and commoners has been replaced by the only natural division into sovereign and people. (MM 6: 329)
I don’t believe that this means that we cannot or should not maintain notions of public dignities. Rather, 
again, the idea is that what we want to rid the system of is notions of inherited public dignity (since this is 
inconsistent with the basic idea of all having innate dignity as a human being, as expressed in the idea of 
the innate right to freedom). The only conception of public offices consistent with the idea of each citizen 
having a right to freedom is one that says that everyone can work their way into any public position, even 
if actually being able to do so will depend to some extent variable factors like talents and luck. As Kant says 
in the Doctrine of Right, “the intention of the state… requires that everyone be able to rise from lower to 
higher offices.” (MM 6: 328) Of course, as we also saw above, the speed of this process and exactly how we go 
about changing it is a somewhat open question, and one that requires sound political judgment concerning 
how to ensure that we can achieve stability for the right reasons—now and in the future. To use the UK as 
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an example, the institution of the Crown (usually on the recommendation of the Parliament) every year 
officially recognizes a number of British persons for their perceived outstanding public contributions to 
the nation—as artists, scholars, soldiers and military leaders, industrialists, charity workers, teachers and 
so on—by conferring various titles on them, such as damehood or knighthood. Again, Kant sees nothing 
wrong with this—quite the contrary—but believes that although one might find oneself in a historical 
condition where actual access to such honors were obtainable only for the few, from certain families, as 
one’s state becomes more well-functioning, they will simply track citizens’ outstanding merit, service, or 
bravery to the country. And indeed, this seems to be the ideal currently informing how the UK now bestows 
such honors onto particular citizens.
To further illustrate some of the points above, let me stay with the example of reforms in the United 
Kingdom over the last few hundred years. So far, the UK has neither chosen to abolish its monarchy nor 
to abolish all elements of its aristocracy. Instead, the legal-political system has gone through many reforms 
(in addition, of course, to periods involving reversals and extreme violence) up until today when members of 
the highest and higher public offices increasingly no longer are chosen only from the nobility and aristocratic 
families, but on the basis of merit alone, and the sovereign (legislative) authority now lays with the people. 
Let me give some more details to fill in some of the important, relevant details here. For example, the highest 
public authority itself has been reformed into a parliamentary democracy supported by a constitutional 
monarchy,44 which includes a (largely and increasingly) independent judiciary, popular, democratic 
self-governance principles for the election of members of the House of Commons and the Prime Minister, 
and (later) non-democratic, yet merit-based election to the House of Lords. Concerning the institution 
of the monarch (or Crown) specifically, over the last few hundred years, although it is still inherited, it has 
been transformed into a representation of a non-partisan (politically neutral) public figure with very little 
political power (except, to some extent, in times of war and national crisis). The royalty today therefore 
mostly performs various public functions that are importantly non-partisan in nature, such as publicly 
recognizing the new Prime Minister (PM) or giving out (the aforementioned) national recognitions of 
merit and honor to citizens on behalf of the country. I don’t think it’s a stretch to say that the Crown aims 
to foster stability and healthy love of country—political emotions of a healthy, stabilizing kind—within the 
bounds set by the laws of freedom and as enabled by a legal-political process over which the monarch has 
no direct control. Correspondingly, this reform process has involved also transforming how the legislative 
process in the Parliament works, including how the House of Commons and the House of Lords came to 
exist and operate. Simplified, instead of being institutions whereby various powerful families (predominantly 
by heritance) gained access to influence the parliament’s legislative process, participation in the House of 
Commons is decided through processes of popular, constitutional democracy, whereas participation in 
the House of Lords is decided by demonstrated merit concerning public affairs (gained through political 
activity or public, scholarly activity, for example). This reform process has therefore involved letting the 
House of Commons remain the main legislative body, whereto the members are chosen through popular 
elections and its leader (the Prime Minister) represents the political party supported by most votes, 
whereas the House of Lords has a critical, questioning function with regard to the politicians’ legislative 
role in the House of Commons. Finally, the judiciary has become increasingly independent, where the 
rising from lower to higher courts aim to track the judges’ merits, meaning their proven ability to apply the 
law and work towards increasing the legal system’s overall ability to serve the people well. Hence, from a 
starting point where much of the public authority was only really accessible to those born into sufficiently 
and relevantly privileged families (inheritance), over time these elements have been eradicated by either 
democratic election or merit-based appointments having taken their place.
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I believe these ways in which the UK has developed are illustrations of what Kant means by how 
those vested with public authority—and everyone else through their engagement with it through public 
discussions—must seek to improve or reform it by making it function closer to the idea of the republic. 
So far, the UK has chosen a combination of various monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements 
in its public authority, and the many reforms (some of which are mentioned above) can be seen as aimed 
at reforming it into become more republican in its institutional form by ridding it of inherited privileges. 
Hence, the monarchic, non-partisan element has been separated from direct political power and instead 
functions as a constant dialogue partner for all sitting Prime Ministers, and it has become an institution 
also non-royals can marry into; the aristocratic elements (House of Lords) has become decoupled from 
inheritance and so has become a better way in which the people directly govern themselves by securing 
a critical, yet knowledgeable, informed voice that constantly raises questions to the popularly elected 
politicians (by being elected not by the politicians themselves, or those who have chosen them, but by 
the institution of the Crown); and the democratic elements for acting through representatives of political 
parties in the House of Commons, which determines who forms the government; and finally the largely 
merit-based, independence system for the judiciary.
The reason why the UK has chosen to do this rather than, say, simply getting rid the monarchy completely 
and turning the House of Lords into straightforward democratic, legislative body where the members are 
chosen in the same partisan ways as they are in the House of Commons, can plausibly be seen, I believe, as 
permissible reasons of political stability. The Crown (the monarchical institution) and the House of Lords 
are deemed stabilizing, non-partisan yet increasingly representative elements in the public legal-political 
structure—and, at least so far, as not easily replaceable, whereas the members of the legislative and 
government authorities are chosen through a representative, democratic process. And I take it that a good 
reason for also undertaking these reforming efforts rather slowly and for seeking a mix between popular and 
merit-based choices as well as allowing for some inheritance are concerns of our human nature. We seek 
to build legal-political institutional structures aimed at securing freedom and law for all and yet that has 
sufficient devices in them to increase the likelihood that they are stable too, given not only that we are the 
social creatures we are, but also how badly and destructively we so easily act. As Kant says in the Anthropology:
If one now asks whether the human species… is to be regarded as a good or bad race, then I must confess that 
there is not much to boast about in it. Nevertheless, anyone who takes a look at human behaviour not only in 
ancient history but also in recent history will often be tempted to take the part of Timon the misanthropist in his 
judgment; but far more often, and more to the point, that of Momus, and find foolishness rather than malice the 
most characteristic mark of our species. But… foolishness combined with a lineament of malice (which is then 
called folly) is not to be underestimated in the moral physiognomy of our species… (A 7: 332f)
The fact that we try to change the institutions somewhat slowly and by combining concerns of our histories 
with those of proven merit (including by popular choices) might, in other words, be viewed as attempts at 
increasing the chances that the operations our public legal-political institutions are wiser than any one of 
us are able to be on our own, including as we are entrusted with public offices. Moreover, given the very 
important stabilizing roles many monarchs have had, including during the historically recent World War 
II, it’s also not far fetched, I believe, to suggest that among the important reasons many countries are not 
simply ridding itself of this institution is that it’s considered unwise to do so before a good replacement—
some other way of institutionally securing related stability and continuity through time—has been found 
for these countries.
b) Reforming the Socio-Economic Systems
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Kant’s comments on socio-economic systems are primarily found in his sections B and C of domestic 
public right (which, as we saw above, concerns various systemic arguments, including about poverty,) 
though he adds comments in the appendix to the Doctrine of Right (MM 6: 369) and in the essay “Theory 
and Practice” (see below). And I have proposed that the state’s guarantee of unconditional poverty relief 
is a minimal condition on a state’s legitimacy and no state can make it illegal to work oneself out of a 
passive condition, whereas active citizenship for all is not such a minimal condition. Moreover, as we 
have also seen, Kant makes two types of arguments here, both of which can be seen as concerning our 
human nature, including problems concerning systemic (socio-economic related) inequality. I believe we 
can make sense of why Kant makes these kinds of arguments, although they may not be as good as Kant 
himself might have thought. As in the case of reforming the public authority, it seems particularly fruitful 
to look at relatively successful related reforms of some liberal states’ socio-economic systems to illustrate 
the kinds of improvements Kant’s position endorses. Before doing this, however, let us look at Kant’s own 
reasoning concerning the possible link between active citizenship and human nature, including actual 
socio-economic conditions, in a little more detail.
In his “Theory and Practice” essay Kant makes the argument about having a right to vote in the following 
way:
The quality requisite to this [voting], apart from the natural one (of not being a child or a woman), is only that 
of being one’s own master… hence having some property (and any art, craft, fine art, or science can be counted as 
property) that supports him – that is, if he must acquire from others in order to live, he does so only by alienating 
what is his and not by giving others permission to make use of his powers—and hence that, in the strict sense of 
the word, he serves no one other than the commonwealth. Here craftsmen and large (or small) landowners are all 
equal, namely each is entitled to only one vote. (TP 8: 296)
For Kant there seems to have been two main concerns informing his view that a lack of sufficient means 
for independence entails passive citizenship. One major concern for Kant on this issue was presumably a 
reflection of living in a period where Europe was coming out of a feudal ownership structure, and so a period 
characterized by a few very powerful landowners. Given this background and given Kant’s basic commitment 
to everyone having an innate right to freedom, it is not so surprising that it is important for him to clarify that 
although a lack of property may make it impossible for one to vote, everyone with sufficient property—and 
he admits in a footnote here that it is difficult to determine “what is required in order to be able to claim the 
rank of a human being who is his own master [is]” (ibid.)—must be entitled to a vote, and only one. Hence, 
in this text Kant continues to emphasize that large, like small, landowners can only be seen as having one 
vote, just like all other active citizens (whoever are and are not included in this category of voting citizens).
A second concern that seems to be right under the surface here is the worry that since passive citizens 
are personally dependent upon others’ powers to obtain a good livelihood—as revealed by them having to 
permit others to make use of their powers, like a domestic servant, rather than merely exchanging services 
or products of services (what is theirs) with them—their votes may be too easily unduly influenced or put 
pressure upon by the persons upon whom they are so dependent. This may be an especially important worry 
when the voting is not, as was typically the case in Kant’s days, done by secret ballot. The problem, then, 
would be that those who were very rich might, in effect, even if not formally, end up with close to control over 
many votes and hence too much political power.45 The institution of secret ballots clearly dealt with the many 
of these worries regarding asymmetrical voting powers.46 In addition, as labor movements brought home, 
arguments concerning a lack of property (private property and skills enabled by education) are unsustainable 
over time in a liberal society. Of course, it is possible that the labor movements came into existence as workers 
became more independent; that is, as they were increasingly exchanging their services rather than giving 
others permission to use their powers and as public education, even if minimal at first, came into existence 
and literacy become more widespread.
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Finally, I believe that Kant wasn’t quite as convinced by his argument concerning women’s “natures” as 
he appears to be here; from the start, he was uncomfortable with his views and it seems fair to hold that he 
at least became increasingly aware of the fact that when it came to women’s alleged inability to partake in 
public reason, it was his prejudices and not good judgement that influenced his thoughts about the issue. 
Still, the important point is that because Kant made sure that his position did not view such nature-based 
arguments as prior to or permitted to set the framework for arguments based on considerations of freedom, 
it was and is not hard to correct this mistake as a matter of theory. And as the women’s movements have 
shown, it has also been possible as a matter of practice. Whether or not some group should be given the 
right to vote before they demand it, is, in contrast, perhaps not an unreasonable question; perhaps it is a fair 
or important consideration of stability (for the right reasons) in situations of transitional justice. In other 
words, perhaps movements such as the labor’s and women’s movements always will come before actual, 
stable reform; that they are what is needed to bring it about. This doesn’t strike me as an implausible view. 47
Still, what is the ideal regarding socio-economic justice that we should seek to realize as we reform our 
imperfect states? When commenting on the importance of making sure that the legal-political framework 
can be seen as acceptable also from the point of view of the poor, Kant emphasizes that the ideal must 
always that it is possible for this person to be “aware that, if he does not reach the same level as others, 
the fault lies only in himself ([his lack of] ability or earnest will) or in circumstances for which he cannot 
blame any other, but not in the irresistible will of others who, as his fellows subjects in this condition, 
have no advantage over him as far as right is concerned” (TJ 8: 293). Basically, then, I believe that as our 
states evolve and we build increasingly complex systems that are determining for how successful we are 
in exercising our rights—such as educational systems, economic systems, political systems etc.—there 
are two things we try to do with regard to socio-economic justice: on the one hand, we institutionally 
guarantee that any citizen’s legal access to means as such is not dependent upon another private person’s 
choice about the matter (by legally guaranteeing unconditional poverty relief), and on the other hand, 
we make sure that the systems that are freedom-determining are themselves accessible to all as free, equal, 
and independent, including so that we can, if we work hard, obtain any kind of public position by working 
within these systems. Securing this kind of social mobility, in other words, is internal to building complex 
societies where the exercise of rights becomes increasingly dependent upon access to systems.
These two principles, in my view, can be seen as part of the better bits of the Scandinavian welfare systems, 
and let me stick with the one I know the best, Norway. After World War II, Norway was a poor country, 
and not until the oil was discovered in the 1960s, did the situation change. Over the course of the next few 
decades, in turn, a so-called welfare state was established, which today means that at age 18, all Norwegian 
citizens deemed capable of full legal responsibility are also materially independent. That is to say, at this 
age, all Norwegian citizens are independent of other private citizens, including economically from their 
parents in such a way that they can work themselves into any societal position, including public position.48 
That is, at this age, all citizens obtain a (public) right to shelter, to health care, to educational loans and so 
on—to anything, in principle, that is deemed necessary to be able to work her- or himself into any type of 
position in society, including as required to hold any kind of public office. Of course, what she or he will 
be able to obtain will depend, as Kant also emphasizes, on factors such as luck and talent, and the system 
is far from perfect. The most important point for our purposes here, however, is that there are not only no 
legal restrictions upon what anyone can do (as compared to anyone else), but that the set of public rights 
that protects each citizen by providing the systemic opportunities that he or she needs to actually be able to 
obtain any level of education and, so, any societal, including public position. Moreover, even if a particular 
citizen fails in her or his endeavours, such as goes personally bankrupt, she or he cannot reasonable blame 
anyone else and there is systemic protection such that he or she will not end up on the street (she may, at 
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most, end up back where the 18 year old is, to start again, from scratch with these basic welfare protections 
in place). In this way, these systems of public law aims to ensure not only that everyone is free and equal, 
but that her exercise of freedom is dependent only on law and so, in this way she is independent of other 
private persons and involves the opportunities for developing abilities needed to take active part in the 
public authority itself through informed public debates, including scholarly debates, and through holding 
public positions. This, I believe, is one way for states to realize the idea Kant is expressing by saying that 
the aim in liberal societies is to create conditions in which each citizen is free, equal, and independent since 
only such an idea is fully reconcilable with the idea of citizens as being subjected only to law (and not each 
other) and as governing themselves through public institutions as dictated, ultimately, by each person’s 
innate right to freedom.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have suggested some ways in which Kant’s sparse comments on self-governance may be 
developed in a way that is consistent with Kant’s fundamental commitments concerning justice, including 
how an ideal theory must make space for various non-ideal considerations. In closing, let me note two further 
things. First, if this account is correct, then one important aspect of reforming these institutions must be to 
build mechanisms ensuring that the public authority is, exactly, exercised as it is should be. In other words, a 
major challenge for any public institution-building project is not only to fight corruption of economic sorts, 
but to ensure that those who are entrusted with public authority are not thereby given unchecked power. 
Kant himself emphasizes this by arguing that each power of the tripartite public authority must check on 
the two others, but we may widen this by arguing that the art of building such institutional frameworks 
include the need to make them transparent and accountable. Given the structure of the account, it follows 
that this is a particularly damning problem when building public institutions; after all, public institutions 
are supposed to the ultimate power-check on private interactions. The danger, in other words, is that the 
power-checking institution itself becomes corrupted; that those entrusted with the offices start treating 
them as their private power. This is not only a problem with regard to straightforward issues concerning 
self-interest, but also issues concerning power over others. For example, given the nature of the account, 
it is not surprising that some of most horrible failures in this regard have been seen in the liberal states’ 
inexcusable failures to build systems of public, legal guardians (foster homes, homes for the mentally ill, 
and so on) in the right way. After all, the most alluring place to anyone who seeks thrills by dehumanizing 
others will be an unchecked dependency relation of personal power—and when we fail to construct our 
public authorities regarding legal guardianship in the right way, such a space is exactly what we create.
Second, notice too, that as we build the legal-political institutions constitutive of civil society, then it will 
typically be the case (for at least some time) that we, as a society, will not be able to guarantee safety and 
equal opportunities for social mobility. The states we inherit usually come with all kinds of dysfunctions 
tracking prejudices, power-abuses, and corruption—or much dysfunction both with regard to personal 
and socio-economic power. Hence, we want to be very careful about instituting new laws and institutions 
that give particular persons too much power or as punishing those on the fringes. To give two prominent 
examples: it is commonly the case that two areas where there is the most violence and abuse are those 
concerning sex work as well as the illegal economy surrounding drugs. Until recently, it seems relatively 
clear that much of the legal-political effort in these regards (in most countries) have focused on those selling 
sex and illegal substances on the streets. Hence, the effect of this practice of criminalization has been to 
make the already vulnerable citizens doubly vulnerable: they are not protected by anyone—in fact, even if 
the police interferes to protect these vulnerable groups (of sellers) against violence from buyers (or from 
those higher up the chain who control them), the police must also charge them with crimes (selling illegal 
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services or substances). Although this is not a place to take a stand on which ways are better here—in general 
or in particular cases—I take it that these are among the main considerations that lead many to advocate 
not only the model, according to which these most vulnerable groups (the sellers on the streets) are not 
criminalized even if the buyers are, but also the model, according to which none of this activity should 
be criminalized since it makes it too hard to protect the sellers (the most vulnerable ones). Regardless of 
models, and in accordance with Kant’s approach, I believe that what different sides in these debates can 
agree on is that the main efforts should be directed at improving the safety of the overall, socio-economic 
systemic conditions facing these sellers, including exit options for those involved, such that engaging in sex 
work or in the selling of strong, narcotic drugs on the streets are not the main or only choices (for securing 
a decent income) ever facing any one citizen.
NOTES
1. Thanks for very useful feedback to Eric J. Miller, Lars Vinx, and the audiences at the following conference and 
workshops: AMINTAPHIL 2014 Conference on Immigration and Citizenship, Chapman University, Oct. 9-12, 2014; 
workshop “Political Representation,” Universidade Federal da Bahia, Salvador, Brazil, Aug. 18-22, 2014; the Department 
of Philosophy, Arizona State University, colloquium, May 2, 2014; the conference “Kant and Republicanism,” Cluster 
of Excellence “Formation of Normative Orders” and Hamburg University, 8-10 April, 2014.
2. Throughout this essay, I refer to all Kant’s works by means of the standard Prussian Academy Pagination as well 
as one or two letters to make it easier for the reader to remember which work this pagination refers to, such as ‘MM’ 
for The metaphysics of morals. All the works referenced in this paper can be found in these collections of Kant’s work: 
“Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view” (KANT, 2007); Practical philosophy (KANT, 1996a); Religion and 
rational theology (KANT, 1996b).
3. The historically most significant legal positivist position that considers itself at least very Kantian, is still, I believe, 
Hans Kelsen in Pure theory of law (KELSEN, 2009).
4. For an overview over many of the distinct approaches to Kant’s legal-political philosophy, see EBELS-DUGGAN 
(2012), as well as VARGEN (2014a).
5. I’m simplifying Kant’s argument somewhat here since he does believe that shame is a social power that can deprive 
others of what is theirs, namely their rightful honor. For more on this point, see, for example, VARGEN (2010a).
6. I expand on this argument in VARDEN (2012a).
7. For an overview over the secondary literature on these points, see VARDEN (2014a).
8. From this point onwards, those who go in more libertarians directions simply argue that the state therefore does 
exactly what individuals ought to do in the state of nature (regulate their interactions by means of the principles 
of private right), whereas those who go in more legal positivist directions argue that the state has rather unlimited 
discretion with regard to how it specifies rights.
9. How one analyzes these issues becomes determining for whether or not one thinks that the state’s special role 
is fundamentally simply enforcing the rules privately determined in the state of nature (i.e. the state’s enforcement 
function), or also regarding the specification (legislative function) and application (judicial function) of the principles 
of private right.
10. I’m particularly grateful to Lars Vinx for discussion on these points.
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11. I’m adding the “one’s” here since I believe the best translation of Kant’s original German would render the text gender 
neutral (and not male as Mary Gregor’s translation has it) in English. I’ve written more on these passages in Kant, including 
as it related to women, in my “Kant and women” (VARDEN, 2015) and “Kant and dependency relations: Kant on the 
state’s right to redistribute resources to protect the rights of dependents” (VARDEN, 2006).
12. Again, for more detail on these interpretive disagreements in the secondary literature, see VARDEN (2014a).
13. My first defense of this kind of approach was in my doctoral dissertation, the first publication from which is “Kant’s 
non-voluntarist conception of political obligations: why justice is impossible in the state of nature” (VARDEN, 2008). 
For obvious reasons, the most prominent other defender of such an approach is (my dissertation advisor) Arthur 
RIPSTEIN (2009). The main difference between our views is that Ripstein formulates the need for the state in terms 
of problems of unilateral acquisition and assurance, whereas I do it in terms of two types of indeterminacy problems 
(specifying laws and applying laws) and assurance. I believe that the two positions are not incompatible, however: the 
main difference is that Ripstein focuses on how, when we arrive (as we usually do) in different times in a territory, we 
acquire things (provisionally) by unilateral force, whereas in my piece I focus on the problems of indeterminacy arising 
when people arrive at the same time. I believe this difference is deceptive, however, because the problem of unilateral 
acquisition (as such) is only a problem of justice for Kant if there is no one specification of the laws at the general and 
applied level. And since Kant (against, for example, Locke’s proposal on the issue) denies that there is one such (unique 
and correct) specification and if his argument works, only then is it the case that one’s enforcement of one’s choices 
about this matter is to subject those with whom one interacts to one’s choices and not to universal law. (Of course, if 
Locke is right that there is one way to specify the laws (of nature) generally and in particular cases, then one can enforce, 
for example, the “enough-and-as-good proviso” without thereby subjecting anyone else to one’s unilateral, arbitrary and 
hence unjustifiable choices. In this scenario, such an enforcement is to subject everyone to the universal laws of nature.) 
I raise Kant-inspired objections to Locke’s and Lockean related conceptions of the natural executive right and private 
property relations in VARDEN (2012b).
14. My original piece on this topic—“Kant’s non-absolutist conception of political legitimacy: how public right ‘concludes’ 
private right in ‘The Doctrine of Right’” (VARDEN, 2010b).
15. I make this argument in VARDEN (2006) for the first time. I respond to Pauline Kleingeld’s criticism of my position 
in VARDEN (2014b).
16. I show this in relation to Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness as well as Robert Nozick’s rightwing libertarianism in 
my “Rawls vs. Nozick vs. Kant on domestic economic justice” (VARDEN, forthcoming).
17. What Kant in the Religion calls the “original predisposition to good in human nature.” (R 6: 26-28) 
18. What Kant in the Religion calls the “the propensity to evil in human nature.” (R 6: 28-32)
19. Cf. TP 8: 292: “They [all citizens] are… equal to one another as subjects; for, no one of them can coerce any other 
except through public law (and its executor, the head of state), through which every other also resists him in like measure…”
20. I’m grateful to Lucy Allais for this useful turn of phrase.
21. The original German word used by Kant here is “recht-liebend,” which is why I have replaced Mary Gregor’s translation 
(“law-abiding”) with “law-loving.”
22. On this point, I believe Kant agrees with Locke: not acting on prudential reasons reveal that we’re acting in stupid 
ways, but they do not reveal that we’re committing injustice. Hence, to justify the coercive establishment of the state, 
only ideal reasons will be sufficient on the ideal account; on such an account we need to show that refusing to enter civil 
society is to refuse the possibility of rightful (just) interactions with others. Of course, if this is the case, then we have 
reason to be suspicious of any interpretation that makes considerations of prudence essential for key arguments, such 
as the reason why we need to establish states, to go through.
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23. Obviously to justify this claim of Kant’s is a larger project, beyond what I can and should do here (as I only want 
to indicate Kant’s basic take on these issues to justify my interpretive assumption). 
24. In the Anthropology, Kant calls these the “technical,” the “pragmatic,” and the “moral” predispositions (A 7:322-25). 
25. Robert Louden ((LOUDEN, 2011)) is probably the one who has written the most on Kant’s anthropology. 
See for example his Kant’s human being: essays on his theory of human nature, but Susan Meld Shell (SHELL, 2009) 
has also engaged the topic quite extensively, such as in her Kant and the limits of autonomy. I deal with aspects of 
his anthropology in my “Kant and women” (VARDEN, 2015) and “Kant and moral responsibility for animals” 
(VARDEN, forthcoming).
26. For Kant’s descriptions of some of the European peoples, see (A 7: 311-321).
27. It’s a little hard to follow Kant here given the way in which he talks of animality and “pure” humanity here. 
To make it easier to understand, he could have written that the capacities to animality and humanity are existentially 
very important, and with the capacity to humanity there is necessarily the possibility of choices (since this capacity 
requires reason, albeit not practical reason). Hence, it is tempting for us not to engage others in the way that “pure” 
humanity would require us to do, which is when we consider each other as having “equal worth” (R 6: 27), but instead 
as having unequal worth. In addition, of course, morality as such—what is justifiable to all, merely in virtue of being 
morally responsible persons—cannot possibly be deduced from these two predispositions since morality inherently 
is enabled by the third predisposition, namely to personality. Hence, Kant argues in this quote, these bad ways of 
doing religious instruction is terribly tempting for being such as us, but also profoundly confused.
28. Nationalism can be bad in much more horrifying ways than this, of course. For one such analysis, see VARDEN 
(2014c).
29. For the purposes of this paper, I have decided to set aside the related work in relation to section E, on punishment.
30. I’m grateful to Arthur Ripstein (in conversation) for this way of describing the structure of Kant’s thinking.
31. Obviously, exactly how one views Kant’s account of public right determines how many of these specifications one 
accepts. As mentioned above, engaging this dispute—on the nature of public right in Kant’s “Doctrine of Right”—is 
beyond what I need to engage here. For example, insofar as one accepts that Kant does maintain that there are innate, 
private, and public right principles constitutive of the idea of the state, one can agree on the general point here and 
disagree on some of the details.
32. As mentioned above, and as argued elsewhere, I believe that the state’s guarantee of unconditional poverty relief 
is a minimal condition on a just state. Hence, without such a provision, the state is not even minimally just. This is 
why I write “good livelihood” here, rather than, say, “survival.”
33. This is emphasized by Kant many places. For example, in “Theory and Practice” he says that “From this idea of 
the equality of human beings as subjects within a commonwealth there also issues the following formula: Every 
member of a commonwealth must be allowed to attain any level of rank within it (that can belong to a subject) to 
which his talent, his industry and his luck can take him; and his fellow subjects may not stand in his way by means 
of a hereditary prerogative (privileged [reserved] for a certain rank), so as to keep him and his descendants forever 
beneath the rank” (TP 8: 292, cf. 293f)
34. As also noted above, Kant suggests that there are can be two plausible sources of such lack of ability, namely 
“nature,” which makes him suggest several places is not only why a minor or child never have the status of active 
citizens, but also women, as well as having the means to be one’s own master, and so those who are excluded on this 
ground include “a domestic servant,” “an apprentice in the service of a merchant or artisan,” “the private tutor,” and 
“the tenant farmer.” (6: 314f, cf. TP 8: 294ff)
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35. This sentence is a little confusing, since it here looks as if Kant is saying that the republic is to be contrasted with 
aristocracies and monarchies—an as we’ve seen above, this just isn’t his view. I believe one can read this two ways: 
either one can read this use of republic as referring to how the highest executive authority would be a president or 
one can read it as concerning how various non-republican (i.e. inherited) elements of the actual operation of the state 
can be reformed. In light of all the other textual evidence, including as we’ve seen it above, I believe the latter reading 
is the one intended here (though obviously it would be philosophically consistent to say either one).
36. This is consistent with how Kant emphasizes that the public authority (or state) in an important sense does not 
own anything as private property: “In accordance with concepts of right, the supreme proprietor cannot have any 
land at all as his private property (for otherwise he would make himself a private person). All land belongs only to 
the people (and indeed to the people taken distributively, not collectively), except in the case of a nomadic people 
under a sovereign, with whom there is no private ownership of land.” (MM 6: 324) Hence, when the monarch is the 
only active citizen (lawmaker), then the monarch simply isn’t a private person and also doesn’t have private property 
at all, which also seems to have been the case historically in Western Europe at least. (The institutions of appanage 
and spaces that are deemed “for their private uses” don’t seem to alter this basic fact: these decisions themselves are 
to be determined by the public authority. Indeed, even if an institution of monarchy is dismantled, it has remained 
to the public authority to decide which property the former royal family will be given to them as private property, 
now as private persons.)
37. I believe this is consistent with Kant’s distinction in “Toward Perpetual Peace” between “the moral politician… 
who takes the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can coexist with morals, but not of a political 
moralist, who frames a morals to suit the statesman’s advantage,” as well as how he a little later says, for example, that 
“A state can already govern itself in a republican way even though, by its present constitution, it possesses a despotic 
ruling power, until the people gradually becomes susceptible to the influence of the mere idea of the authority of law.. 
.and thus is found fit to legislate for itself (such legislation being originally based on right).” (PP 8: 372)
38. Here is Kant’s rather tricky text on this point: “The different forms of states are only the letter… of the original 
legislation in the civil state, and they may therefore remain as long as they are taken, by old and long-standing custom 
(and so only subjectively), to belong necessarily to the machinery of the constitution. But the spirit of the original 
contract… involves an obligation on part of the constituting authority to make the kind of government suited to the 
idea of the original contract. Accordingly, even if this cannot be done all at once, it is under obligation to change the 
kind of government gradually and continually so that it harmonizes in its effect with the only constitution that accords 
with right, that of a pure republic, in such a way that the old (empirical) statutory forms, which served merely to bring 
about the submission of the people, are replaced by the original (rational) form, the only form which makes freedom 
the principle and indeed the condition for any exercise of coercion, as is required by a rightful constitution of a state 
in the strict sense of the word. Only it will finally lead to what is literally a state. This is the only constitution of a state 
that lasts, the constitution in which law itself rules and depends on no particular person. It is the final end of all public 
right, the only condition in which each can be assigned conclusively what is his; on the other hand, so long as those 
other forms of state are supposed to represent literally just so many different moral persons invested with supreme 
authority, no absolutely rightful condition of civil society can be acknowledged, but only provisional right within it. 
Any true republic is and can only be a system representing the people, in order to protect its rights in its name, by all 
the citizens united and acting through their delegates… But as soon as a person who is head of state (whether it be 
a king, nobility, or the whole of the population, the democratic union) also lets itself be represented, then the united 
people does not merely represent the sovereign: it is the sovereign itself. For in it (the people) is originally found the 
supreme authority from which all rights of individuals as mere subjects (and in any event as officials of the state) 
must be derived; and a republic, once established, no longer has to let the reins of government out of its hands and 
give them over again to those who previously held them and could again nullify all new institutions by their absolute 
choice.” (MM 6: 340)
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39. If this is roughly right, notice the important similarities between this view of public reason and the one advanced 
by John Rawls from Political Liberalism (RAWLS, 1993) onwards.
40. We find the main arguments yielding his account in the Doctrine of Right (MM 6: 238) as well as in the “What 
Is Enlightenment?” essay (WIE 8: 36-42) and the “Theory and Practice” paper (TJ 8: 289-307. See also Jonathan 
Peterson’s (2008) interpretation of Kant’s “private/public” reason distinction in his “Enlightenment and freedom”.
41. Kant also includes the right to punish in his list here, but since he turns to this issue in a separate section (section 
E), I also discuss it separately. 
42. Kant says “The anomaly of subjects who want to be more than citizens of the state, namely born officials (a born 
professor, perhaps) may have crept into the machinery of government from older times (feudalism, which was 
organized almost entirely for war).” (6: 328)
43. As mentioned above, unless one puts in place an idea of everyone being “able to rise from lower to higher offices” 
in light of their merit, one ends up with a system that will “fall into the hands of sheer incompetence” (6: 328). 
44. Given my purposes here, I’m doing my best to be as theoretically uncommitted as possible in this illustration. 
Hence I’m utilizing the UK’s own, official descriptions here: http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/parliament-
government/. Also, I’m not of course saying that all of this happened peacefully—for example, James II did violently 
resist related reform efforts leading to the 1699 “Glorious Revolution”—but the royal family as such didn’t (after James 
II was deposed, he was replaced by his own daughter, Mary II, together with William III) and the process could have 
proceeded without violent resistance from James II.
45. Obviously, the same worry could be raised with regard to the issue of women having votes; if they were so personally 
dependent on their husbands (including if it was in their natures that they would be so dependent), then all married 
men could end up with, in effect, two votes, and all unmarried ones only one.
46. I believe the practice of secret ballot started in Europe in the elections in France in 1795, and so two years after 
“Theory and practice” (1793) was published. If so, this could be the reason why Kant does not repeat this kind of 
argument in the Doctrine of Right (1797). In any case, the late 1700’s/the 1800’s was a period when various secret 
ballot acts passed in several states, and hence it seems reasonable to believe Kant was paying attention to these 
discussions in his thinking too.
47. I discuss this question in my paper “Kant and women” (VARDEN, 2015).
48. At least if we count the fact that one can marry the monarch, since the current King (Harald) and Crown Prince 
(Haakon) are married to non-royal citizens. (Interestingly, unlike the other monarchies in Europe, the first monarch 
of the last line (King Haakon) only agreed to take over as monarch (as part of a constitutional, representative 
democracy) when Norway seceded from Sweden in 1905 if the Norwegian people so chose. Hence, he was chosen by 
referendum (1905); a fact that seems consistent with how Kant envisions peaceful transitions involving the highest 
public offices, as described above.
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